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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "gatekeeper" is used with some regularity these days to
describe the roles of various professionals who work to keep
corporations from running afoul of the law in their dealings with the
public, thereby helping to avoid harm to investors and the markets.' For
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
The author appreciates the comments and suggestions of Professors Laura Bartell,
Kingsley Browne, Stephen Calkins, Paul Dubinsky, Noah Hall, and Arthur Laby.
1. There is no single definition of what constitutes a gatekeeper for a corporation
whose securities are traded in the public markets. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs ofLegal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 890 (1984):
Gatekeeper liability has received widest play in response to securities
violations and similar "transactional" delicts rather than in response to
wrongdoing that occurs wholly within the bowels of the firm. Gatekeepers
can be drafted from among the many outsiders who supply specialized
expertise to the managers of publicly-held corporations and facilitate their
relations with constituencies outside the firm: outside directors, lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers.
Id.; Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 946 (1998):
The traditional gatekeeper acts as both a centralized source of information
and decisionmaker in removing products from the market. Purchasers may
simply look to see which products make it to the market to determine
whether the product made it through a gatekeeper's screening process.
Regardless of the purchasers' level of sophistication or knowledge,
traditional gatekeepers ensure that buyers purchase products above only a
certain level of quality.
Id.; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1297 (2003) ("[Gjatekeepers are independent professionals who
are so positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation
may be unable to effect some transaction or to maintain some desired status.")
[hereinafter "Attorney As Gatekeeper"]; Arthur B. Laby, Diferentiating Gatekeepers, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FiN. & COM. L. 119, 123 (2006) ("[A] person or firm that provides
verification or certification services or that engages in monitoring activities to cabin
illegal or inappropriate conduct in the capital markets."); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REv. 323, 327 (2007)
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example, auditors are charged with reviewing corporate financial
statements to ensure they accurately reflect assets and liabilities, while
investment bankers require sufficient disclosure of the risks facing a
company when it seeks to sell securities to the public. Even lawyers have
seen the label slapped on them for how they advise clients on
transactions.
Corporate counsel have come to be seen as one on the roster of
financial gatekeepers because they are well-equipped to prevent
violations, using their authority to keep a deal from happening if it is
tainted by fraud or misrepresentations.2 Professor John Coffee points out
that corporate lawyers, unlike litigators, oversee the due diligence
process and prepare disclosure documents used in a range of deals, from
bank loans and government contracting to selling stocks and bonds in the
markets, putting them in a position to call a halt if there is anything
untoward.
Calling someone a gatekeeper is a pithy shorthand for recognizing an
obligation to monitor compliance with the law. There is a nagging fear
("Gatekeepers work with an enterprise to correct misreporting before it occurs. They do
so by threatening to withhold support necessary to complete a report or consummate a
transaction. Gatekeepers can deny access to capital markets."); Sung Hui Kim,
Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 411, 413 (2008) ("[Plrivate
intermediaries who can prevent harm to the securities markets by disrupting the
misconduct of their client representatives."); Emerich Gutter, Whistleblowers Under the
Dodd-Frank Act and Their Impact on Gatekeepers, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 753, 755
(2011) ("Gatekeepers help prevent the formation of a market for lemons by reducing the
impact of informational asymmetries. Because gatekeepers are perceived as credible,
independent parties, their investment of reputational capital assures the market of an
activity's legitimacy."). Regardless of the definition one might choose, the role of the
gatekeeper is to serve as an intermediary to prevent misconduct by the corporation.
2. Professor Coffee argues that focusing on gatekeepers may be a more effective
way of policing corporations:
Because the gatekeeper will receive little, if anything, from corporate
involvement in crime or misconduct, [so] it can be deterred more easily than
can the corporation or its managers, who may profit handsomely from crime
or who may be tempted to engage in criminal activities to achieve goals or
thresholds that allow them to remain in office.
Coffee, supra note 1, at 1297. Professor Morgan, on the other hand, takes a much less
sanguine view of labeling lawyers as gatekeepers, asserting that the term "is almost
useless" and warning that if the lawyer has one of the few companies looking to act
dishonestly, "you should get out of that representation immediately." Thomas D. Morgan,
Comment on Lawyers As Gatekeepers, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 375, 377 (2007).
3. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, 192 (Oxford 2008) [hereinafter "GATEKEEPERS"]. Professor Laby notes
that "[a]ll gatekeepers are not alike," and there is a need to distinguish the roles played by
those who are independent of the corporate client, like an outside auditor, from those who
work within the organization or are retained directly by it, such as lawyers. Laby, supra
note 1, at 120.
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that those inside an organization may be so overwhelmed by the pressure
to produce results to retain the good favor of managers that they will do
almost anything to succeed in meeting unrealistic internal sales targets or
Wall Street's omnivorous expectations of rising quarterly earnings, and
corporate lawyers may be powerless to stop transgressions.4 The
gatekeepers should be the thin blue line, if you will, between the
insatiable corporate appetite for success at any cost and the demands of
the government and investors that companies not even test the line of
legality. Gatekeepers protect the public by putting their own reputational
capital at risk in certifying compliance with the law, servinf as
intermediaries who can prevent wrongdoing within an organization. But
are lawyers up to that task?
For lawyers, at least, this expansive approach to gatekeeping,
especially if it entails reporting potential violations to outsiders,
seemingly conflicts with the traditional understanding of the attorney as
representing solely the interests of the client. Under this view, lawyers
are "zealous advocates" owing no obligation to protect the interests of
third parties, except perhaps ensuring that legal services are not misused
for illegal or obstructive conduct.6 In the transactional context, however,
imposing an additional obligation on corporate counsel to keep the
company from harming investors and the markets does not necessarily
detract from the representation of the client because the two roles are at
least plausibly compatible. One of the corporate lawyer's jobs is to
certify the client's compliance with the law, so that preventing violations
4. See Professor Stephen L. Pepper, Three Dichotomies in Lawyers' Ethics, 28 GEO.
J. LEGAL Enncs 1069, 1081 (2015) (with particular attention to the Corporation As
Client) ("Putting the limited roles and goals of the business executive and the lawyer
together in service to a very large and powerful non-human entity - the typical major
corporation - is a frightening notion.").
5. Coffee, Attorney As Gatekeeper, supra note 1, at 1299-99:
The gatekeeper in effect pledges reputational capital that it has built up over
many years and many clients to secure its representations about the
particular client or transaction. At least in theory, a gatekeeper would not
rationally sacrifice this reputational capital for a single client who accounts
for only a small portion of its revenues.
Id.
6. See Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-the-Ladder
Reporting by Insulating in-House Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL.
J. CoRp. L. 861, 868 (2015) ("I]t is one thing to suggest that an attorney can withhold
consent from completing a possible fraudulent transaction, but it is quite another thing to
extend the role of a gatekeeper to one that should report out confidential corporate
information to the SEC."); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There A Role for
Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VLL. L. REv. 1097, 1102 (2003) ("The role of
a corporate lawyer has been the subject of two competing visions: the hired gun or total
commitment model and the gatekeeper model.").
2016]  1
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or reporting misconduct would usually be in the corporation's ultimate
best interest, even if it causes some short term pain by potentially
scuttling a deal or triggering an investigation and possible sanctions.7 If
monitoring transactions were all that a lawyer acting as a gatekeeper was
supposed to do, then there should be little controversy about this added
role for corporate counsel. When part of your job is to make sure the law
is not broken in the transaction, it is not a particularly onerous
requirement to impose a modest gatekeeping function8 on a company's
lawyers even if, as a practical matter, it is difficult to make sure
employees do not commit crimes or regulatory violations on behalf of
the organization.
Catchy labels have a certain visceral appeal, so they can be easily
expanded to contexts beyond their accepted meaning. For example,
"insider trading" has a fairly narrow application to the misuse of
information for personal profit in breach of a duty of trust and confidence
in connection with trading in securities. But as of late it has been used by
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman to describe something
he called "Insider Trading 2.0" to assail the use of private market data for
profitable trading by high frequency trading firms.9 That is not the type
of securities fraud denominated as insider trading because there would be
no misuse of information and the data is available to anyone willing to
pay.10 But calling something insider trading generates an immediate
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 360 (2004):
Litigators tend to view the attorney's role narrowly as that of an advocate
for, and protector of, the client-a bulwark between the client and an
oppressive state. Securities attorneys are less ready to buy into this rhetoric,
however, and generally do not have the same self-image of themselves. For
the most part, they agree that they have at least an ethical responsibility to
perform due diligence on documents they draft and file with the SEC. For
over a quarter century, prominent securities attorneys have recognized that,
as a result, their professional role is closer to that of the auditor than to that
of the litigator.
Id.
8. See Fred Zacharias, Lawyers As Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 1387, 1389
(2004) ("Lawyers are gatekeepers and always have been. Whatever one's position on the
merits of the specific reforms currently being proposed, it is important to avoid the
misconception that lawyers have no role to play in preventing client misconduct.").
9. Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, A.G.
Schneiderman Calls For New Efforts To Eliminate Unfair Advantages Provided By
Trading Venues To High-Frequency Traders (Mar. 18, 2014) (on file with author).
10. See Peter J. Henning, What's So Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70 Bus. LAW.
751, 762 (2015):
What Mr. Schneiderman is targeting is not insider trading, at least in the
United States, because there is no breach of a fiduciary duty in dispensing
the information. Indeed, under the securities laws, there is nothing illegal
32 [Vol. 62:1
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negative response, so the moniker is a handy one to apply even if the
actual transactions do not fit the legal definition of a violation. Similarly,
a Ponzi scheme, named after Charles Ponzi for his efforts to entice
investors to send him money for postage stamp speculation," involves
soliciting new investors to pay off earlier ones to maintain the fagade of a
successful program.12 But that term was used by Eliot Spitzer, the former
New York Attorney General and Governor, in 2009 to describe how the
Federal Reserve Board responded to the financial crisis by providing
bailout loans to numerous banks that were secured by distressed assets
that had little market value at the time.13 It was certainly a fetching
rhetorical flourish, but the Troubled Asset Relief Program was far from
the type of scheme designed to fleece gullible investors by using new
money to pay off old investors; indeed, the federal government made a
about a firm selling access to information it generates properly, at least so
long as it is within the control of the provider and offered to anyone willing
to pay.
Id.
11. Chief Justice Taft, in Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924), explained how
Mr. Ponzi's scheme unfolded:
In December, 1919, with a capital of $150, [Charles Ponzi] began the
business of borrowing money on his promissory notes. He did not profess to
receive money for investment for account of the lender. He borrowed the
money on his credit only. He spread the false tale that on his own account he
was engaged in buying international postal coupons in foreign countries and
selling them in other countries at 100 per cent. profit, and that this was made
possible by the excessive differences in the rates of exchange following the
war. He was willing, he said, to give others the opportunity to share with him
this profit. By a written promise in 90 days to pay them $150 for every $100
loaned, he induced thousands to lend him. He stimulated their avidity by
paying his 90-day notes in full at the end of 45 days, and by circulating the
notice that he would pay any unmatured note presented in less than 45 days
at 100 per cent. of the loan. Within eight months he took in $9,582,000, for
which he issued his notes for $14,374,000. He paid his agents a commission
of 10 per cent. With the 50 per cent promised to lenders, every loan paid in
full with the profit would cost him 60 per cent. He was always insolvent, and
became daily more so, the more his business succeeded. He made no
investments of any kind, so that all the money he had at any time was solely
the result of loans by his dupes.
Id. at 7-8.
12. See In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am., 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A
'Ponzi' scheme is any sort of fraudulent arrangement that uses later acquired funds or
products to pay off previous investors.").
13. MSNBC, Eliot Spitzer Takes On The Fed - MSNBC w/ Dylan Ratigan (7/24/09),




profit on a number of the programs used to prop u  the economy after the
financial crisis hit.14
Describing someone as a gatekeeper acting on behalf of the
corporation is a metaphor for how outside professionals (like lawyers)
should ensure companies make full and complete disclosure consistent
with their legal obligations. But like most evocative metaphors, it is
malleable and prone to misuse. The notion of the gatekeeper harkens, at
least in the videogame version of medieval life, to armor-clad guards
protecting the entrances to a medieval city from marauders, someone
who does more than just act as a clarion but also as a protector. So it is
not just ensuring compliance with applicable laws that marks the
gatekeeping role, but the notion can be expanded to include a more
active role to prevent misconduct and report those misdeeds.
There appears to be a developing view of the lawyer that extends the
gatekeeping obligation to require blowing the whistle on misconduct.
The oft-heard lament from judges and regulators decrying "Where were
the lawyers?" when malfeasance occurs is usually offered without regard
to whether attorneys should have been able to keep violations from
happening or were somehow required to report wrongdoing as soon as
they became aware of it.' 5 If the occurrence of corporate violations
means there was gatekeeper failure, and if lawyers are gatekeepers for
their corporate clients, then the obligation of counsel may be much
broader than just ensuring transactions stay within the bounds of the
law.16 Instead, it may also involve ferreting out potential misconduct and
14. For example, the Public Private Investment Program put in place by the
Department of the Treasury to help restore the market for residential and commercial
mortgage-backed securities, resulted in a profit of over $3.8 billion on the original
investment of $18.6 billion. See Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program,
PROGRAM UPDATE, Oct. 28, 2013, at 3, . available at
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/External%20Report/`2013%20-9%20Final.pdf.
15. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN.
L. REv. 1 (2009):
Whenever a new corporate or governmental scandal erupts, onlookers ask,
"Where were the lawyers?" Why would attorneys not have advised their
clients of the risks posed by conduct that, from an outsider's perspective,
appears indefensible? When numerous red flags have gone unheeded, people
often conclude that the lawyers' failure to sound the alarm must be caused
by greed, incompetence, or both.
Id.
16. Speaking in favor of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Senator John Edwards used the
following logic to highlight the role of lawyers in the corporate decision-making process:
The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone. Anybody
who works in corporate America knows that wherever you see corporate
executives and accountants working, lawyers are virtually always there
34 [Vol. 62:1
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telling the government when it occurs, adding to the gatekeeping
obligation a measure of whistleblowing - yet another analogy.
This emerging role for lawyers comes on the heels of corporate
conduct like that seen at Enron and during the financial crisis.'
Corporations have instituted much more extensive compliance programs
in the past few years, although it is hardly a surprise that those have not
stopped all misconduct. What has been spawned is a new practice area t
most large law firms, which offer services to help companies comply
with the law, with the promise of reduced penalties and less legal
exposure.18  With compliance now the norm, the push from the
government appears to take the notion of a gatekeeper a step further by
requiring corporate lawyers, in particular those inside the company, to do
more than just monitor how the organization responds to reported
wrongdoing. It appears that the role of the corporate lawyer is evolving
to include an obligation to ensure that regulators and prosecutors are
apprised of any potential misconduct as soon as that knowledge becomes
available. This shifts the onus to the company's lawyers to come forward
with information that may be harmful to the client, a form of
whistleblowing without all the bells and whistles like monetary rewards
and,anti-retaliation protections that usually accompany those programs.
looking over their shoulder. If executives and/or accountants are breaking
the law, you can be sure that part of the problem is that the lawyers who are
there and involved are not doing their jobs.
148 CONG REC. S6524-02, S 6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
17. Ahmed and Farkas, supra note 6, at 873 ("Both the Enron scandal and the 2008
financial crisis point to the stark reality that upper management has the propensity to
engage in such conduct. When managerial malfeasance does occur, the consequences for
the corporation and investors are dire."); Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why
Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1089, 1090 (2008) ("That gatekeeper failures
substantially contributed to the Enron and WorldCom scandals is already well
recognized.").
18. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV.
949, 952 (2009) ("The sheer size of the compliance industry, which includes multiple
American Lawyer 100 firms who proudly trumpet their assistance on their websites,
severely undercuts the notion that corporations and compliance providers are engaged in
a concerted, bad-faith attempt at intentional window-dressing."); William S. Laufer,
Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1343, 1345 (1999):
An elaborate cottage industry of ethics compliance and preventive law
experts lay claim to dramatically reducing the likelihood of criminal liability
by maintaining an organizational commitment to ethical standards.
Corporations need only commit the necessary capital and human resources to
insure against the devastation of a criminal investigation, indictment, and
conviction. Unfortunately, the reality of corporate compliance and criminal




Indeed, the current rules established by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") for its whistleblower program generally excludes
corporate counsel from receiving a reward for providing information
obtained in the course of representing the client.'9
For the lawyer who fails to inform the government of all potential
wrongdoing, there is the potential of a prosecution for obstruction of
justice. The job of the corporate attorney is moving away from the "wise
counselor" model of legal representation and toward that of the
whistleblower obliged to disclose information about potential violations
by the corporate client or risk being viewed as a participant in the
misconduct, subject o civil and criminal sanctions. This view of the
gatekeeper's obligation puts lawyers, especially in-house counsel at a
company, in an almost untenable position because it assumes a measure
of independence from corporate management hat might not exist.2 0
The focus of this essay is on the developing role of the corporate
lawyer, especially in-house counsel, as a gatekeeper with expanded
reporting obligations21 that makes counsel into a type of whistleblower,
and the questions this triggers about fitting new obligations within the
traditional view of the attorney as owing an exclusive duty to the client.
The in-house lawyer is put in the most difficult position because that
attorney has only a single client and must interact with management on a
19. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-
4(b)(iv)(4)(i) (2015):
The Commission will not consider information to be derived from your
independent knowledge or independent analysis in any of the following
circumstances: (i) If you obtained the information through a communication
that was subject to the attorney-client privilege, unless disclosure of that
information would otherwise be permitted by an attorney pursuant to
§ 205.3(d)(2) of this chapter, the applicable state attorney conduct rules, or
otherwise.
Id.
20. See Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business
Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1105, 1111 (2005) ("Lawyer independence, however, is
effective at checking client misconduct only if lawyers actually act independently.
Underlying much of the contemporary misgivings, both among lawyers and in popular
consciousness, is the concern that obligations of independence are too often honored in
the breach.").
21. See Pam Jenoff, Going Native: Incentive, Identity, and the Inherent Ethical
Problem of in-House Counsel, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 725, 731 (2012):
The in-house attorney's role as gatekeeper has taken on exponentially greater
significance following scandals such as Enron and Tyco, in which corporate
attorneys were found to have been negligent, or in some cases, complicit in
fraud. Moreover, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in response to these
scandals has placed a greater level of responsibility upon corporate counsel
for detecting and reporting suspected violations.
Id.
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regular basis - the very people the government may want identified as
the wrongdoers who exercise significant control over the lawyer's future
livelihood.22 This can be especially problematic when lawyers can be
viewed as a cost center in a company who contribute little to its bottom
line, at least in any direct way.23 The American Bar Association has long
opposed imposing any reporting obligation on attorneys acting as
gatekeepers, such as disclosing possible money laundering by clients.24
To avoid the cumbersome process of trying to impose new ethical rules
for lawyers, which would likely require congressional approval, the
government has taken a backhanded approach by telling lawyers that
they are the next targets in an effort to prevent corporate misconduct.
Taking an indirect approach by threatening the livelihood of attorneys
may entice them to disclose wrongdoing more quickly, adding a
whistleblowing function to the role of corporate gatekeeper.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF GATEKEEPING
In the late 1980s, Lincoln Savings & Loan surrounded itself with
prominent lawyers and accountants, helping give the impression that it
was complying with the law. Federal District Judge Stanley Sporkin,
once the director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, questioned how
so many highly qualified professionals could have missed the fraudulent
activities going on at the bank seemingly right in front of them. He
wrote:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now
asserting their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these
clearly improper transactions were being consummated? Why
didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions? Where also were the outside accountants and
attorneys when these transactions were effectuated?2 5
22. See Pepper, supra note 4, at 1079 ("In-house lawyers working in the corporations
are not just vulnerable to but also clearly dependent upon the client. They are employees
with very limited short-term mobility and just the one client.").
23. See Jenoff, supra note 21, at 733 ("Whereas in a firm the lawyers are the
rainmakers or fee generators who bring in the revenue, in a company the attorneys are
back office expense and arguably more expendable.").
24. See American Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates, Task Force on
Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migratedleadership/recommendations03/1
04.authcheckdam.pdf.
25. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
2016] 37
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Of course, the idea that lawyers and other gatekeepers should
actively prevent misconduct may overlook the incentive to let a client
come as close to the line as possible on the assumption that the
government is unlikely to discover wrongdoing on its own.26
Whistleblowers who try to work through internal mechanisms may
not be able to rely on the gatekeepers to fulfill their limited obligations to
prevent misconduct. Sherron Watkins, at the time a vice president at
Enron, wrote an anonymous letter in 2001 to the company's chief
executive, Ken Lay, outlining financial and accounting problems that
included this prescient observation: "I am incredibly nervous that we will
implode in a wave of accounting scandals."27 Mr. Lay turned to the
company's regular outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, to conduct an
investigation. But rather than order the type of thorough internal inquiry
we are used to seeing today, the law firm was told that there should be no
"second-guessing" of the decisions made by Enron's outside auditors
from Arthur Andersen, nor was it to engage in a "discovery-style"
investigation.28 Add to that the law firm's own role in helping craft the
financial vehicles used to engage in the problematic accounting
maneuvers at issue, and the conclusion was almost foreordained-Vinson
& Elkins found nothing that would require a more complete investigation
of the company.29 This conclusion came a few months before Enron's
(and Arthur Andersen's) precipitous collapse due to the accounting fraud
26. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 349 ("If the system relies on gatekeepers to
promote fair reporting, and gatekeepers know that, it is not irrational for gatekeepers to
believe that they can conceal complicity.").
27. Anonymous Memorandum from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate
Development, Enron, to Kenneth Lay, Chairman, Enron (Aug. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/enron/exhibit/03-15/BBC-0001/Images/98 11.001.PDF.
28. The use of regular outside counsel may well have been an effort to ensure that a
thorough investigation was not undertaken. Professor Hazard pointed out a few years
before Enron's. accounting fraud came to light that "there are times, I have been told,
when outside counsel may be retained on the basis of selected facts precisely to
accommodate a response that provides a desired outside opinion." Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1011, 1019 (1997).
29. See Gutter, supra note 1, at 762-63:
Attorneys from the firm were heavily involved in the structuring of Enron's
SPEs, which were so complex that Enron may have been unable to use the
entities without the firm's assistance. Even more concerning, Vinson &
Elkins responded to concerns that Enron would 'implode in a wave of
accounting scandals' by issuing a report stating that the company need not
reevaluate its use of SPEs. Enron announced a $1 billion deduction from its
third-quarter earnings the next day.
Id.
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that came to light, resulting in numerous convictions of Enron executives
but no discipline for its lawyers.30
Prior to the corporate accounting scandals of the early twenty-first
century, the bar was quite resistant to the notion that lawyers had any
type of gatekeeping role in connection with their clients, or that the SEC
should play any role in regulating the conduct of corporate counsel.31
That changed in 2002 when Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
the wake of the collapse of Enron and other companies from accounting
fraud that took steps to address the failure of lawyers and others to do
enough to prevent misconduct inside companies.3 2 Section 307 of the law
gave the SEC the power to adopt rules authorizing lawyers to report
corporate misconduct, and to discipline violators by suspending or even
barring violators from future representation before the agency.33 The
rules adopted under this provision include "up-the-ladder" reporting to
the highest authorities within a corporation, and if that does not succeed
in addressing the problem, then an attorney is authorized to report
misconduct to the SEC.34
This was seen at the same time as a significant step in turning
lawyers into gatekeepers for their corporate clients. In offering this
30. See Peter J. Henning, Board Dysfunction: Dealing with the Threat of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 585, 592-93 (2008):
After a one-month 'investigation' that included interviewing eight Enron
executives, two accounting partners at Arthur Andersen, and Watkins-but
little else-Vinson & Elkins reached the unsurprising conclusion that Enron
had not suffered any harm from Fastow's transactions despite the conflict of
interest and "aggressive accounting." The law firm reported that the
company's auditors were comfortable with transactions they had previously
approved, the expected response of anyone asked about their professional
services. The only fault the law firm could find with the transactions was that
they represented "bad cosmetics"-as if accounting and related-party
transactions were simply a matter of appearances and spin.
Id.
31. See Theodore Sonde & F. Ryan Keith, "Up the Ladder" and Over: Regulating
Securities Lawyers-Past, Present & Future, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 331 (2003):
Since that time, the legal profession, in one form or another, has tried to
deny its responsibilities for client conduct that may be fraudulent or worse.
At the same time, the profession has disputed the authority of the SEC to
discipline its members when they violate the securities laws or assist their
clients in doing so.
Id.
32. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
33. Id. at § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784. Section 307 provides that "the Commission shall
issue rules . . . setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission." Id.
34. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorney Appearing and Practicing Before
the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
392016]
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provision, then-Senator Jon Corzine asserted that "we cannot overlook
the role corporate lawyers, the lowest common denominator, can play in
addressing abuses and ensuring that our markets have integrity."
Professor Coffee, in his influential book "Gatekeepers: The Professions
and Corporate Governance," noted that "[flew attorneys probably
consider themselves gatekeepers" but argued that "differences between
the corporate lawyer and the litigator all suggest that the corporate
lawyer is well positioned to serve as a gatekeeper."36 Despite resistance
from lawyers who viewed themselves solely as the "zealous advocates"
of their clients, the idea of a gatekeeping role began to be accepted, at
least in the transactional context.
But the SEC decided not to adopt a proposal-that went even further
by authorizing a "noisy withdrawal" that would have required counsel to
disclose that the representation of the client had been terminated "based
on professional considerations."3 7 Fierce opposition from the organized
bar, worried about how this would affect the attorney-client relationship
and the protection of communications, led the SEC to drop the
proposal.38 The rule in place is similar39 to amendments adopted by the
American Bar Association in 2003 to Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13(c) that permits a lawyer for an organization to breach the
protection afforded to confidential client communications by reporting to
others to stop illegal activity when the leadership of the corporate client
refuses to desist from misconduct that is a clear violation of law.40 In
35. 148 CONG. REC. S6556 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Corzine).
36. Coffee, supra note 1, at 192-93.
37. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296-01 (Feb. 6, 2003). The proposed rule would have required an attorney, in certain
circumstances, to withdraw from representation, of an issue, to notify the Commission
that they have done so, and to disaffirm documents filed or submitted to the Commission
on behalf of the issuer. Id. The SEC deferred implementing the proposed rule, and it has
not been considered again.
38. Sonde & Keith, supra note 31, at 332 ("The release caused an uproar in the legal
community, with the rules as drafted threatening to revolutionize the contours of the
attorney-client privilege, as well as the general corporate environment to which issuer-
clients and securities lawyers had become accustomed.").
39. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 1387 n.l ("The ABA's most recent revisions to the
Model Rules includes a revised Model Rule 1.13 . . . that parallels the adopted and
proposed SEC regulations.").
40. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(c) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to
address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that
is clearly a violation of law, and
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addition, the SEC authorized an attorney to go outside the organization
and report wrongdoing if there was not a sufficient response to reported
wrongdoing.41 That decision put the rule in the middle of a much more
contentious discussion over whether a lawyer could disclose confidential
information about a client's fraudulent conduct, not just potential
violence. In 2001, the ABA House of Delegates rejected a proposal to
allow disclosure of client fraud, just months before the Enron accounting
shenanigans broke.42 It took until 2003 for the ABA, following the SEC's
lead, to amend Model Rule 1.6 to permit a lawyer to disclose information
to prevent or recti 4 financial harm in which the client had used the
attorney's services.
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1988); see also Caroline
Harrington, Attorney Gatekeeper Duties in an Increasingly Complex World: Revisiting
the "Noisy Withdrawal" Proposal ofSec Rule 205, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 893, 900-01
(2009) ("The 2003 amendments to the Model Rules were symbolically significant, given
the organized bars' pre-SOX reluctance to assign any duties of preventing or rectifying
client fraud, at least since'the 1983 adoption of the Model Rules.").
41. Roger C. Cramton, et. al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REv. 725, 728 (2004).
42. Id. at 729:
Periodically, the ABA's House of Delegates had considered proposals to
amend Model Rule 1.6, the rule on lawyer-client confidentiality, to allow
lawyers to disclose substantial frauds, at least those in which the lawyer's
services had been used, but time after time the House of Delegates refused,
albeit by relatively slim majorities. Most damning, the ABA House of
Delegates rejected just such a reform proposal in August 2001, a few months
before the disclosure of Enron's massive frauds.
Id.
43. Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the New
Realm ofFederal Regulation ofLegal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 609, 642-43 (2003):
In August 2003, the ABA resolved the Model Rules' internal conflicts by
amending ABA Model Rule 1.6. Amended ABA Model Rule 1.6
affirmatively permits a lawyer to disclose its organizational client's
confidential information to prevent, mitigate, or rectify the consequences of
client crimes or fraud that threaten substantial financial harm to others and in
which the lawyer's services were used. In so doing, the ABA followed the
SEC's lead with respect to lawyers' whistleblowing activity.
Id; see also Ryan Morrison, Turn Up the Volume: The Need for "Noisy Withdrawal" in A
Post Enron Society, 92 Ky. L.J. 279, 302 (2004) ("Because of Enron, the ABA reversed
course in 2003 and amended Model Rule 1.6 to include the crime or fraud exception.");
Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law
Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 559, 601-02 (2005):
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As tough-minded as these new ethical rules appeared, disclosure to a
third party under the SEC and legal ethics rules remained optional, not
mandatory, so that the lawyer who learns about a corporate client's
intention to engage in misconduct, or has been doing so with counsel's
assistance, must report to superiors but need do nothing further." There
is no obligation to warn victims or the relevant authorities that a
company has embarked on a course that is likely to result in violations.45
Instead, the rules only give permission to reveal what is intended, with
the lawyer retaining discretion to decide if an outside report should be
made, and to whom." That report, of course, would likely cost the
lawyer a client, and for in-house counsel, probably their job-a heavy
price to pay for making a discretionary choice. There are no reported
instances of such disclosures to outsiders over the objection of a
corporate client, although there are undoubtedly situations in which
corporate counsel has threatened to do so as a means to get management
to desist from illegal action. But the notion of the lawyer as a gatekeeper
insuring the corporate client does not violate the law remains largely a
private matter, shrouded behind the protections afforded by client
confidentiality unless the lawyer chooses to make misconduct known.47
The financial meltdown in 2008 caused another crisis in confidence
about whether companies were willing to follow the law. The perception
has been that executives at Wall Street firms and the global banks got
away with fraudulent activities that resulted in significant financial harm
with no personal accountability for the losses suffered by investors.48
Why did the changes to Rules 1.13 and 1.6 pass this time? Presumably
because the ABA felt compelled to "do something" when it appeared that the
SEC, in implementing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was about to
impose even sharper constraints on the discretion of lawyers representing
public corporations-i.e., more demanding ladder-climbing duties and perhaps
even a "noisy withdrawal" duty.
Id.
44. Michael L. Fox, To Tell or Not to Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 867, 888, 891 (2002).
45. Id. at 896 ("In some respects, Sarbanes-Oxley appears to be only a codification of
the ethics rules. There is no whistle-blower provision for outside reporting, and this
makes the law unexceptional in some respects, and, very possibly, too small and too
weak of a band-aid in others.").
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., id at 891 ("[T]he ABA Model Rules . . . have, in their provisions,
allowed for much more discretion on the part of the attorney with regard to the handling
of misdeeds by constituents of the corporate client.").
48. See Ted Kaufman, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs Too Big To Jail, FORBES (July
29, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/29/why-doj-
deemed-bank-execs-too-big-to-jail/ ("[T]hose most responsible for indicting and
prosecuting Wall Street executives seem to believe that, just as there are banks that are
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Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York and the premier official for prosecuting financial misconduct,
lamented the difficulty of holding individuals responsible for corporate
misconduct:
Maybe there's a lot of smoke-now comes the proof. This guy's
going to testify, "My accountant's a smart guy-I just relied on
my accountant." The accountant's going to say, "I just relied on
what he gave me," and everyone has plausible deniability. That's
a simple example of a way in which people can get away with
even criminal activity when they're making false certifications to
the government.49
Comparisons have been made between the corporate debacles
triggered by the accounting frauds at companies like Enron with the
excessively risky investment programs, especially those involving
subprime loans and mortgage-backed securities, that fueled the financial
crisis.o Once again, the perceived failures of lawyers along with other
gatekeepers was a featured point in the critique of corporate
misconduct.51 Thus, this signaled a shift away from viewing the lawyer
as having gatekeeping duties only in the transactional context.
too big to fail, there are people who are too big to jail."); see also Jed S. Rakoff, The
Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BooKs (Jan. 9, 2014), http:// www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-
crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ ("[T]he Department of Justice has never taken the
position that all the top executives involved in the events leading up to the financial crisis
were innocent; rather, it has offered one or another excuse for not criminally prosecuting
them-excuses that, on inspection, appear unconvincing.").
49. George Packer, A Dirty Business, THE NEw YORKER, June 27, 2011, at 51.
50. See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A
Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics ofFinancial Risk Taking, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1213 (2011):
There is a strong similarity in this crisis with the round of financial reporting
scandals from earlier in the decade-Enron, WorldCom, and the like-that
provoked Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Lawyers are at
the heart of the disclosure risk management that Sarbanes-Oxley demands,
as are independent directors, especially those on the audit committee, and the
firm's independent auditors. Something did not work the way it was
supposed to, and there is pressure to do much better.
Id.; see also Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the
Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 365 (2009) ("Among the many
leitmotifs of the financial crisis is the failure of lawyers as regulators and gatekeepers.




To enhance the ability to detect and prosecute corporate misconduct,
the Dodd-Frank Act goes in a different direction than the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act by encouraging corporate insiders to report violations through
whistleblower programs that offer enhanced financial incentives in
exchange for supplying information about corporate wrongdoing.52 Much
to the chagrin of management, the SEC rules implementing the
whistleblower program permit employees and others with knowledge of
potential violations to go straight to the government with information
rather than first reporting internally through expensive compliance
programs that companies spent large amounts of money to implement in
the wake of Enron and its ilk. 53 Moreover, the protection afforded to
corporate whistleblowers is much broader under the Dodd-Frank Act,
with a private right of action against an employer who retaliates for
reporting misconduct.54 The new program has led to an increasing flow
of information to the SEC, unfiltered by corporate lawyers, that has
allowed the agency to initiate investigations and pursue civil
enforcement actions for conduct that might have gone unnoticed.
II. EXPANSION OF THE LAWYER'S GATEKEEPING ROLE
There is a growing sense that lawyers may not be fulfilling even the
limited gatekeeping role they have been called on to play since the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act because corporations continue to engage in
misconduct.56 This has led to a subtle shift in the language used to
describe how the government perceives lawyers charged with keeping
companies from engaging in misconduct. Where the lawyers were once
seen as a first line of defense inside a corporation whose presence would
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2010).
53. Securities Whistleblowers Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-
9(a)(1)-(2) (2011).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2010).
55. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress on
the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, at 3 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/officps/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf:
As a result of the Commission's issuance of significant whistleblower
awards, enforcement of the anti-retaliation provisions, and protection of
whistleblower confidentiality, the agency has continued to receive an
increasing number of whistleblower tips. In Fiscal Year 2014, OWB
received 3,620 whistleblower tips, a more than 20% increase in the number
of whistleblower tips in just two years.
Id.
56. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 333 ("[L]awyers no doubt play a role in
superintending capital market integrity, although it is not exactly clear whether they are
gatekeepers or whistleblowers or something more of a hybrid.").
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make it more difficult to act improperly, they are now viewed as acting
with a bullseye on their backs as potential targets of prosecution and civil
enforcement actions when violations do occur. SEC Chairwoman Mary
Jo White, in a March 2014 speech, stated, "We will continue our focus
on pursuing these cases to ensure that gatekeepers understand their
special duties and responsibilities, and that they will be held accountable
if they do not safeguard the interests of investors as they are obligated by
law to do."58 It is not clear exactly what those "special duties and
responsibilities" are, but there is an ominous tone that lawyers are not
doing enough to prevent misconduct.
The notion that an attorney representing a company owes an
obligation to someone other than the client appears to be the accepted
norm now, rather than a novel extension of the role of counsel in
representing a corporation. Chairwoman White pointed out that the SEC
planned to "enlarge our enforcement footprint with a renewed focus on
'gatekeepers,"'5 9 a warning shot that lawyers would be among those
subjected to increased scrutiny and enforcement actions, which would
affect their ability to continue to practice law. The means for holding
lawyers responsible for misconduct by a corporate client can come
through the authority granted to the SEC to pursue violations based on a
defendant aiding and abetting a violation, which now includes both
knowing and reckless conduct that "provides substantial assistance" in a
violation. If the lawyer has participated in a business decision that
results in a violation, or fails to take steps to prevent the violation, then
such behavior could be viewed as a measure of assistance, which could
turn the attorney into an accomplice.
SEC Commissioner Kara M. Stein pointed to the lack of cases
against lawyers for their failures as a gatekeeper as a potentially
troubling shortcoming in the SEC's current enforcement program.6 1 In a
speech in May 2014, she stated:
But one gatekeeper that often is absent from the list of cases I
see every week are the lawyers. Lawyers often serve as trusted
advisers, and they give advice on almost every corporate
transaction. They prepare and review disclosures that investors
57. Mary Jo White, SEC Chairwoman, Perspectives on Strengthening Enforcement




60. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2010).




rely upon - disclosures that are at the core of the Commission's
regulatory program. And in most cases, they do a good job. But
when lawyers provide bad advice or effectively assist in a fraud,
sometimes their involvement is used as a shield against liability
for both themselves, and for others. Are we treating lawyers
differently from other gatekeepers, such as accountants?62
Ms. Stein points to a lawyer's "bad advice" as one basis for finding
that they are participants in a company's violation, especially if their
work could help shield others from potential liability.63 It is more,
however, than just the lawyer's failure to prevent misconduct ex ante
under the traditional gatekeeping role that is being scrutinized. Instead,
Ms. Stein focuses on the provision of legal services as a basis for
identifying corporate counsel as one of the perpetrators of misconduct, or
as an accomplice, so that failing to prevent violations would itself
constitute a violation.64
The threat of criminal prosecution of counsel in connection with
representation of the corporate client came to fruition in 2011 in the case
of Lauren Stevens, an in-house lawyer for GlaxoSmithKline.6 1 She was
charged with obstruction of justice and making false statements to the
Food and Drug Administration for failing to turn over documents in
response to a request for voluntary disclosure related to off-brand
promotion of a drug manufactured by the company.6 6 The trial ended
when the district judge granted an acquittal at the close of the
government's case-in-chief based on his finding that Ms. Stevens acted




65. United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D. Md. 2011).
66. Id. The original indictment in the case was dismissed without prejudice because
the federal prosecutors failed to properly instruct the grand jurors about the advice of
counsel defense and may have failed to submit exculpatory evidence for the grand jury's
consideration before returning the indictment. See id:
The grand juror's question was not just any question, but rather was much
akin to asking about an elephant in the room. The grand jury was well aware
of the Defendant's role as the leader of a team of lawyers and paralegals, and
the question was a natural one that arose out of her status. The question went
to the heart of the intent required to indict. The incorrect answer either
substantially influenced the decision to indict or, at the very least, creates
grave doubt as to that decision. Accordingly, dismissal of the indictment is
appropriate and required in the interests of justice.
Id.
67. Id. at 562. See also Katrice Bridges Copeland, In-House Counsel Beware!, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 391, 392 (2011) ("Judge Titus, who presided over Stevens' trial,
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Despite the favorable outcome, the in-house attorney was put in a
position no lawyer ever wants to be in: facing criminal charges for how
she represented her client in responding to a government inquiry. The
obstruction of justice laws are very broad, so legal representation can
easily slip over the line from vigorous defense to illegal conduct, at least
68in the view of prosecutors.
Corporate lawyers have been targeted in other instances in which
they participated in business decisions that turned out to violate the law.
Starting in 2005, a number of companies reported backdating stock
options issued to employees that were not Xroperly disclosed in their
filings with the SEC and violated tax laws. Among those accused of
civil violations for their role in the backdating were lawyers from Apple
Inc.70 and Mercury Interactive LLC,71 while criminal charges were filed
against attorneys at Comverse Technology72 and Monster Worldwide.73
These lawyers failed as gatekeepers at their respective companies by not
ensuring that the option grants complied with the relevant tax laws and
the timely disclosure required of a publicly-traded company.74 The
business and legal decisions regarding options awards largely
overlapped, thus exposing the company's lawyers to prosecution for their
involvement in the substantive violations, even if they did not have the
ultimate decision-making authority.
found that Stevens acted in good faith and on the reliance of counsel in her response to
the FDA's inquiry. . . ").
68. See Greta Fails, The Boundary Between Zealous Advocacy and Obstruction of
Justice After Sarbanes-Oxley, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 397, 420 n.103 (2012):
While the Stevens case could arguably be a one-off-an example of rogue
prosecutorial overreach that is unlikely to be repeated . .. the prosecution's
legitimate arguments, the instability of interpretations of section 1519, and
the policy goals underlying Sarbanes-Oxley counsel that this may be the first
in a line of cases in which prosecutors attempt to police lawyer conduct.
Id.; see also Copeland, supra note 67, at 415 ("The Stevens prosecution is the ultimate
example of targeting an attorney for her legal advice.").
69. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. C 07-2822 JF (RS), 2008 WL
4544443 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008); S.E.C. v. Nancy R. Heinen and Fred D. Anderson,
No. 07-2214-HRL (Lloyd) (N.D. Cal. April 24, 2007); United States v. Olesnyckyj, No.
07-cr-120 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Sorin, No. 06-cr-723 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
70. Heinen, No. 07-2214-HRL (Lloyd).
71. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2008 WL 4544443.
72. Sorin, No. 06-cr-723. The defendant was sentenced a year-and-a-day in prison
after pleading guilty.
73. Olesnyckyj, No. 07-cr-120. The defendant was sentenced to one year of probation.
74. See Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2008 WL 4544443; Heinen, No. 07-2214-HRL




Along with greater scrutiny of lawyers, there has been an increase in
the regulatory requirements imposed on corporations, which draws
counsel more deeply into dealings with the government. Financial firms
are now subject to oversight from multiple regulators, not only at the
federal level but also in the states where they operate. 76 It is common
these days to see settlements in which multiple agencies assess penalties
along with the Department of Justice extracting its own fines.77 For
example, Bank of America reached a $16.65 billion civil settlement
related to the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities that involved
payments to the Department of Justice, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the SEC, along with attorneys general in California,
Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, and New York.
The reach of regulators has been extended to industries once largely
outside the purview of federal oversight. For example, the automobile
industry had long operated without much scrutiny from the federal
government, and the primary safety regulator-the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")-was at best a minor nuisance
to the automakers.79 That has changed since the revelation by General
Motors ("GM") in 2014 of defective ignition switches in its vehicles that
caused at least 120 deaths and multiple injuries as the company failed to
identify the cause of numerous accidents for years.80 A report8' prepared
by Anton R. Valukas after an internal investigation pointed to what the
76. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Bank of America
to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud
Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014) (on file with author).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Bent Snavely and Alisa Priddle, NHTSA's Rosekind is Cracking Down on U.S.
Auto Industry, DETRorr FREE PRESS (May 24, 2015),
http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/2015/05/24/nhtsa-mark-rosekind-recalls-
automotive-gm-takata-fiat-chrysler/27648463/:
NHTSA was belittled on Capitol Hill during hearings over the General
Motors ignition switch crisis last year and blamed for not taking aggressive
action in 2009 when Toyota's sudden acceleration problems urfaced. And
in 2013, the agency was openly challenged by Fiat Chrysler Automobiles on
its initial call for recall of 2.6 million Jeep SUVs. FCA later agreed to a
lesser recall.
Id.
80. Antonin R. Valukas, Report to the Board of Directors of General Motors
Company Regarding Ignition Switch Recalls (May 29, 2014), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/NHTSA+Electronic+ReadingtRoom+(ERR)
[hereinafter " Valukas Report"].
81. Id.
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company's CEO called a "pattern of incompetence and neglect,"82
finding that "[a]lthough everyone had responsibility to fix the problem,
nobody took responsibility."83 In one instance, a new attorney asked why
a recall had not been issued and was told "this is how it works. We raise
it with engineering and they decide."84 GM fired some of its lawyers for
failing to respond to the defect in a timely manner.85 It is important to
note that these lawyers were litigators, which is not the type of role for
an attorney generally engaged in the gatekeeping function typically
involved in protecting investors and the market. Yet, that should not
insulate them from at least some of the blame for how long the defect
86
went undetected and exposed consumers to grave risk of injury.
The Valukas Report includes an interesting recommendation for how
GM's lawyers should interact with the government in the future:
"NHTSA should be viewed not only as a regulator but also an ally in the
effort to ensure that the Company's vehicles are as safe as they can be.
Interactions with NHTSA should be consistent with that type of
relationship."8 Note that this "ally" imposed the maximum $35 million
civil penalty on GM for its failure to timely report the ignition switch
defect.88 That certainly looks like a much more adversarial approach
from the regulator than conduct by an agency aligned with the company.
Given the power regulators have over the companies they oversee,
including the authority in some fields to remove officers and directors
from office and impose significant fines on the organization, can
corporate counsel realistically consider an agency to be an "ally"? If so,
82. See Bill Vlasic, G.M Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect Over Fatal Defect, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2014, at Al.
83. Id. See also Valukas Report, supra note 80, at 2.
84. Valukas Report, supra note 80, at 184 n.846.
85. See Peter J. Henning, How G.M.'s Lawyers Failed in Their Duties, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (June 9, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/how-g-m-
s-lawyers-failed-in-their-duties/. The company settled the criminal investigation by
agreeing to a deferred prosecution agreement that required it to forfeit $900 million and
use a monitor for three years to assess its compliance with auto safety standards. Press
Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Criminal Charges Against General Motors And Deferred Prosecution
Agreement With $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17, 2015) (on file with author).
86. See Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers: Friends or Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1867, 1867-68 (2016) ("Though primary blame should perhaps rest with GM's
engineers, who apparently did not understand how their vehicles were built, GM's inside
lawyers, who handled engineering, safety, and products liability issues, must be faulted
for having obscured the deadly defect.").
87. Valukas Report, supra note 80, at 263.
88. Press Release, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department
of Transportation Announces Record Fines, Unprecedented Oversight Requirements in
GM Investigation (May 16, 2014) (on file with author).
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then that would signal a major change in the relationship between the
lawyer and an organizational client by expanding the attorney's role to
serving the regulator's needs along with those of the corporation, acting
perhaps as a whistleblower on behalf of the government to ensure it has
complete information about potential violations while also representing
the company. How those two roles would be reconciled is a significant
challenge because the rules of the profession continue to view the lawyer
as owing a primary duty to advance their client's interests by maintaining
the confidentiality of information and providing competent
representation, even if the lawyer believes the client engaged in
wrongdoing.
This new approach will have its greatest impact on the in-house
lawyer, who serves a single client and participates in a range of decisions
that have implications for how business is conducted. This lawyer is in a
particularly precarious position because they do not have an array of
clients to fall back on, thus their livelihood depends on maintaining a
good working relationship with management. In serving the corporate
client, that lawyer has to avoid becoming "Dr. No" by responding
negatively to most management inquiries about how to proceed.
Corporate counsel has to build up trust with executives so that they will
seek out legal advice rather than shut the lawyers out of business
decisions. But there is also the danger of an in-house lawyer becoming
too much a part of the management "team" who will fall in line and not
dissent from directives issued by more senior officers, even if it puts the
company at risk of violating the law.89
If an additional duty is also owed to the regulators to act as a type of
whistleblower in fulfilling the gatekeeping function, then there will be
89. See Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and
Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1034 (1997) ("Corporate counsel often
acknowledge the increased effectiveness that they enjoy when senior management
believes that they are 'team players."'); see also Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud:
Re-Situating the Inside Counsel As Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 983, 1003 (2005)
("Management creates the reality for inside counsel. Management defines objectives,
identifies specific responsibilities for inside lawyers, and determines whether an inside
lawyer's performance is acceptable. Management is vested with the authority to speak on
behalf of the organization and is entrusted to give direction to inside counsel."); Deborah
A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 955, 976-77
(2005) ("Solidarity between a general counsel and other members of senior managerhent
can compromise counsel's service as a legal adviser and as the company's agent in its
dealings with third parties . . . ."); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The
Tensions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation,
62 Bus. LAW. 1, 25-26 (2006) ("The in-house lawyer's involvement in business strategy
and offering business advice can create pressure, often asserted by corporate managers,
on the lawyer to enable transactions rather than to act as a 'bottleneck' to getting the deal
done.").
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suspicion among management about divided loyalties even among the
most conscientious managers. That can lead to serious concerns about
whether the most sensitive information should be shared with lawyers
who may conclude there is an obligation to report to their "ally" - the
government regulator.90 The more in-house lawyers are perceived as
potential whistleblowers, the less corporate management will include
them in their deliberations.91 For the lawyers, the challenge is dealing
with the representatives of a client-individuals potentially viewed by the
government as wrongdoers-who control their economic well-being.92 In
90. See Jan C. Nishizawa, Ethical Conflicts Facing in-House Counsel: Dealing with
Recent Trends and an Opportunity for Positive Change, 20 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 849,
856 (2007) ("When trust is placed in the in-house counsel to provide legal and business
advice, the in-house counsel's decision to confront corporate constituents about suspected
wrongdoing may cause a breakdown in trust.").
91. That does not mean the lawyers will never learn of misconduct, but it is more
likely to be ex post than ex ante. That may lead to riskier decisions that could lead to
criminal and civil penalties. Professor Coffee argues that the potential for reporting
outside the company will still have a deterrent effect on management, even if the in-
house lawyer is not consulted in advance. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 363:
Thus, even if it were true that clients would consult less, this impact could be
more than fully offset by the fact that it would become more dangerous to
disregard the lawyer's advice. Add to this mix the likelihood that ex ante
advice will not be chilled, and the net impact is to increase the attorney's
leverage over the client by making it more dangerous to ignore the attorney's
advice. If law compliance is the goal, such an impact seems socially
desirable.
Id. It is difficult to separate out the legal issues from the underlying business decision,
and so management may find it more expedient to keep the lawyers away from the
process when there is a greater risk that it will be revealed if they are present. That may
encourage conduct which tests the limits of the law even if it is not something done with
the intent to violate the law. Thus, the lawyer's effectiveness will be diminished because
legal advice will be largely reduced to ex post consultation rather than ex ante guidance.
92. See Kim, supra note 89, at 1005-06:
But for inside counsel, as employees of the firm, the economic pressures are
not just greater in degree, but also different in kind. First, inside counsel are
necessarily economically dependent on a single client. If they get fired, they
lose their entire income, their insurance, and their basic livelihood. If
pensions or stock options have not vested, then enormous sums of money
can be forfeited as well. Even worse, if they get fired for whistle-blowing,
they may get blacklisted-without recourse under the law to sue for
retaliatory discharge. Second, even if getting fired is not likely, inside
counsel feels unremitting pressure to justify herself and her department as a
corporate cost center. In today's competitive and profit-oriented
environment, no position feels completely secure, and the case that an
adequate return on firm investment is being achieved must always be made.
The best way to do so is to facilitate, not interfere with, corporate




that context, asking the lawyer to act as a type of whistleblower with
none of the protections afforded that role may be going too far in
changing the role of corporate counsel.
m. CONCLUSION
If corporate counsel, in particular an in-house lawyer, is expected to
view regulators as an "ally" by providing information that makes
government oversight more effective, then that may undermine the
gatekeeping role that puts the attorney in the position to prevent
misconduct. If lawyers are kept away from risky or sensitive business
decisions because of the potential they will disclose information harmful
to the corporation, then an uncounseled client may well stray across the
line into illegality. Holding lawyers accountable for helping a company
commit fraud or other illegal acts is nothing novel because legal advice
does not magically immunize the attorney from the consequences of a
recommended course of conduct that turns out to violate the law. But
expanding the lawyer's gatekeeping function to require that appropriate
steps be taken to ensure the government has been made aware of
potential violations shifts the attorney away from what is most important
about having a gatekeeper-preventing violations before they occur. In
essence, the fact that a company violates the law should not necessarily
mean corporate counsel failed. Asking lawyers to do more to assist the
government in ferreting out wrongdoing by reporting violations on peril
of being identified as a participant in the misconduct risks compromising
the ability of corporate counsel, especially those working inside the
organization, to effectively represent heir client.
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